Abstract. Epistemic decision theory (EpDT) aims to defend a variety of epistemic norms in terms of their facilitation of epistemic ends. One of the most important components of EpDT is known as a scoring rule (used to measure inaccuracies of credences). This thesis addresses some problems about scoring rules in EpDT. I consider scoring rules both for precise credences and for imprecise credences. For scoring rules in the context of precise credences, I examine the rationale for requiring a scoring rule to be strictly proper, and argue that no satisfactory justification has been given. I then investigate one possible response to my argument and show the problems with this response. The conclusion is that there is a further need for justifying the requirement that a scoring rule should be strictly proper for precise credences. For scoring rules in the context of imprecise credences, an impossibility result has been established in the literature purporting to show that no strictly proper, continuous and real-valued scoring rule exists. However, a precise statement of the impossibility result requires precise definitions both of strict propriety and of continuity in the context of imprecise credences. Moreover, the result implies that we need to drop one of the three properties - strict propriety, continuity or being real-valued - to have a scoring rule for applying EpDT to imprecise credences. So, firstly, I offer definitions of strict propriety and of continuity and clarify the impossibility result. Then, I investigate what will happen if we drop one of the three properties. I argue that we should drop the property of being real-valued and I offer the general forms of two kinds of strictly proper, continuous and lexicographic scoring rules for imprecise credences.